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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the role of information structure (i.e., informa-
tion cost, reliability,_ and distribution among agents) in the design of a 
regulatory mechanism for controlling non-point source pollution. An ambient 
concentration tax mechanism is examined for a non-point source pollutant with 
spatial transport among multiple zones. Imposition of the tax requires costly 
measurement of ambient concentrations in selected zones, and the selection of 
zones for measurement must be undertaken without perfect information regarding 
several parameters of the problem. Potentially crucial information issues in 
this context include: (a) the cost of measuring ambient concentration may 
exceed the benefits from imposing the tax, though these costs can be substan-
tially reduced by carefully targeting monitoring sites; (b) producers' 
responses to the tax depend on prior beliefs regarding the fate and transport 
mechanism, and the efficacy of the ambient tax will depend upon the regula-
. tor's ability to ascertain and, perhaps, modify those beliefs; and (c) without 
regard to the extent to which the ambient concentration tax is imposed, it may 
be optimal for the regulator to acquire additional information regarding the 
fate and transport mechanism, either for the entire region or for specified 
"problem" zones. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As progress is made in controlling point-sources of pollution, non-point 
source problems command greater attention. The rising concern with off-site 
consequences of agricultural chemical application provides a prominent 
example. But the design of regulatory mechanisms to control non-point source 
pollutants raises a different set of issues than those which arise in control-
ling point source pollutants. The new issues concern the cost and reliability 
of information about the linkages between control costs and the fate and 
transport of the pollutant. Answers to the question "What information is 
available at what cost" should be expected to play a crucial role in determin-
ing the structure and parameters of the best regulatory mechanism for the 
problem at hand. Indeed, the useful distinction between point and non-point 
source pollution problems is in the differing cost structures for the acquisi-
tion of information regarding important parameters of the problem. In the 
case of point source pollution, emissions, or effluent loadings, created by 
individual polluters are regarded as "measurable". Such magnitudes are not 
regarded as "measurable" in cases of non-point source pollutants, or measur-
able only at a cost which is automatically prohibitive. More generally, there 
may be several variables which describe important dimensions of a pollution 
problem: levels of inputs used and technology applied in polluting activi-
ties, effort applied and technology available for pollution abatement, and 
parameters of the biogeophysical process that transform a regime of polluting 
activities into a geographic distribution of ambient concentrations which 
cause harm. Rather than being "measurable" or "unmeasurable", these magni-




While considerations of the cost of information and informational 
asymmetries between polluters and regulators have been raised in the discus-
sion of proposed regulatory mechanisms, such considerations have rarely played 
an explicit role in formal models designing and comparing mechanisms for 
pollution control. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of 
information structure (i.e., cost, reliability, and distribution. among agents) 
in the context of the ambient concentration tax mechanism recently proposed by 
Segerson [10]. Therein, the author develops a novel control mechanism for 
non-point source pollutants in which firms pay a tax based upon the ambient 
concentration of a pollutant. The linkage between production and ambient 
concentrations (i.e., the fate and transport mechanism) is assumed to be 
uncertain, but with a known and commonly held prior distribution. In this 
paper, Segerson's tax mechanism is extended in three directions. First, the 
symmetry between the producers' and regulator's beliefs regarding the fate and 
transport mechanism is relaxed. Second, the Segerson tax is extended to allow 
for multiple damage sites. Third, the cost of acquiring information and the 
reliability of that information is explicitly incorporated into the design of 
the optimal tax. This information can characterize the production and control 
practices of the regulated firms, reduce uncertainty regarding the fate and 
transport mechanism, or reveal ambient concentrations at additional sites. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The economic literature of pollution control has considered a wide range 
of regulatory mechanisms, and implementation of any of these mechanisms 
requires the acquisition of certain information concerning the pollution 
problem at hand. The large number of geographically dispersed polluters in 
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the case of non-point source pollution raises the importance of information 
requirements in mechanism design. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
current effort to implement the Conservation Compliance provisions of the Food 
Security Act of 1985 is a case in point. This effort requires processing 
information on essentially all farms which participate in federal farm 
programs. 
Regulatory incentive mechanisms use devices such as direct imposition of 
standards, prescriptions of technology in the polluting activity, charges, 
subsidies, or transferable permits. In turn, standards, subsidies, or charges 
can be based on effluent characteristics, ambient concentrations, input use, 
or technology choice. Further, design of any mechanism must address the issue 
of how much the mechanism will recognize the many sources of heterogeneity 
among polluters, or the extent to which these sources of heterogeneity will be 
ignored by lumping together polluters which differ in some more or less 
important respect. The extent to which the mechanism is tailored· to heteroge-
nous polluters will have important implications for the information burden 
imposed by the regulation. 
Regulatory mechanisms always rely on information about the important 
parameters of the problem at hand, but the nature of information which must be 
acquired varies widely among mechanisms. For example, the traditional form of 
government intervention directed to reducing agricultural erosion has required 
observation of the individual farmer's cultural practices; taxes on agricul-
tural chemicals, as in the state of Iowa, only require information on usage of 
the chemicals concerned; the novel system of charges proposed in Segerson [10] 
would require information on ambient concentrations of pollutants. Mechanisms 
can also vary in the nature of the information requirement, as distinguished 
from the nature of information required. Information requirements may be 
dictated by initial implementation of the regulation, routine administration 
of the mechanism, or enforcement of compliance. 
While considerations of costly acquisition of information and informa-
tional asymmetries between the polluter and the regulator have often been 
raised in discussion of proposed regulatory mechanisms, such considerations 
have rarely played an explicit part in formal models comparing regulatory 
mechanisms for pollution control. Despite the absence of well developed 
formal analysis of mechanism design treating the trade-offs between informa-
tion costs and allocative efficiency, at least two branches of the economic 
literature of pollution control mechanisms bear on the issue. 1 First, some 
progress has been made concerning the optimal geographic scale for the 
regulation of a single pollutant. While it is generally recognized that 
information costs vary with the level of aggregation at which a mechanism is 
to be applied, 2 and that these costs must be balanced against the allocative 
benefits of more finely tailored regulatory mechanisms, these considerations 
have not been thoroughly treated. 3 
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In addition to the burden of information costs implied by the level of 
detail, or degree of specificity of the mechanism, choice of regulatory 
mechanism will imply certain information costs associated with enforcement. 
There is a literature which examines the trade-offs between enforcement effort 
and compliance with the regulatory mechanism, and compares mechanisms on these 
grounds. A program of enforcement associated with a particular mechanism 
implies information requirements, and the cost of enforcement obviously will 
depend on the information structure of the pollution problem at hand. Thus, 
enforcement considerations also imply a dependance of mechanism design on 
information structure, a problem which is likely to be particularly important 
for regulation of non-point source pollution. 
III. A SPATIAL MODEL OF NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
A. Notation 
Consider a geographical region consisting of N zones. The region is 
determined by the jurisdiction of the regulator. The zones divide this 
jurisdiction according to the nature of damage from the pollutant under con-
sideration and production and pollutant transport attributes of the region.' 
Specifically, from the damage perspective, zones are defined to be small 
enough so that the presence of a given level of the pollutant within the zone 
implies a given damage to society. Thus, a single measurement of ambient 
pollution level within the zone is sufficient to determine the damage to 
society. From the pollution creation perspective, areas must be small enough 
so that the fate of a pollutant entering the environment from within the zone 
can be treated as the same, without regard to the precise location of release 
of the pollutant. This division is based upon the mechanics of transport, 
including hydrologic characteristics, prevailing winds, etc. 5 Finally, the 
initial zone divisions are· specified so that opportunity cost of pollution 
abatement is uniform within the zone. For agricultural non~point source 
pollution, for example, this division will depend upon the productivity 
attributes of the soil. 
The non-point source pollutant of interest originates within the region 
as a by-product of a single production process that can be undertaken in any 
of the zones, with y1 denoting· the level of production in zone i andy. • 
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(yl, ... ·YN)'. Individual firms can reduce the level of pollutant entering the 
6 
environment from within their zone through abatement effort, denoted by a 1 , 
with a. • (a1 , ... ,a8 )'. In general, there need not be a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the abatement effort, a1 , and abatement level. For example, in 
an agricultural context, a1 may represent alternative tillage or rotation 
practices, a1 and y1 can then be viewed as joint outputs of the farm. The 
cost of producing y1 with abatement effort a1 is denoted by C1 (y1 , a1 ), where C1 
is assumed to be a strictly convex function of y1 and a1 • 
The combination of y. and a. determines the ambient level of pollution 
in each zone through a transport mechanism. Specifically, let X1 denote the 
ambient level of pollution in zone i, with X. • (X1 , ...• ~)'. These pollution 
concentrations are determined by the transformation X. - T(y. ,a.,e) (i.e., 
T:xK X x" X xH ~ xK) where ' is an M X 1 vector of stochastic transport 
effects. 6 The random component reflects the uncertainty on the part of both 
regulators and firms regarding the exact nature of the transport mechanism, 
due to such factors as weather and imperfect knowledge of relevant physical 
processes. The regulator is assumed to have a prior on the distribution of 
these unknown factors, denoted by fr(<), while producers are assumed to share 
a potentially different prior, denoted by fp(<). The priors onE in turn 
generate priors on the ambient conditions that result from a given level .of 
production activity and abatement level within the region. 
Finally, the damage to society from the pollutant in question is assumed 
to be a nondecreasing function of the vector of ambient pollution levels and 
is represented by the function D(X.), where 01 • ao;ax, ~ 0, i-1, ... ,N. A 
convenient simplification of this function considered below assumes that D(X.) 
K 
-I d,(X,), where ad,(x)jax ~ 0 vi. 
i-1 
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B. Taxes on Ambient Pollution Levels Under Uncertainty 
Seger son [ 10] proposed a pollution control mechanism in which firms pay 
a tax based upon an uncertain ambient level of pollution with a known distri-
bution. Firms and regulators were assumed to share a common prior on the 
transport mechanism. In this section, a multizone version of Segerson's tax 
is considered. Specifically, a tax on the producers in zone j is considered 
where the tax is calculated as the product of the tax rate, tJk• and the 
ambient level of pollution in zone k. Unlike Segerson, however, a distinction 
is made between the regulator and producer priors regarding the transport 
mechanism. Initially, the administrative costs associated with the tax, 
including the cost measuring the ambient pollution level, are ignored. 
The regulator's problem is one of choosing the optimal level for each 
tJk· First, however, the producer's problem of choosing output and abatement 
effort is dealt with. 
I. The Producer's Problem 
The producer in zone j faces a vector of taxes, denoted by cJ. • 
(tJl•· .. ,tJN), and uncertainty regarding the transport mechanism, T. Each firm 
is assumed to be a price taker and risk neutral, maximizing its expected 
profits and taking the level of production and abatement in other zones as 
given. Thus, the firm in zone j solves: 
1rJ(tJ.) • Max E,.<PYJ- CJ(yJ,aJ)- tJ.X.) 
Y;· "; 
Max {pyJ - CJ(yJ,aJ) - E,.(tJ.X.]) 
Y;, "; 
(1) 
where p denotes the price for the producer's output and~() denotes the 
expectation operator given the producer's prior distribution one, fp(<). 
Assuming that an interior solution exists satisfying the usual second order 
conditions, firm j's optimal output and abatement levels yj(tJ.) and aj(tJ.) 
will solve: 7 
M 
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- I tjk T)k 
k•l 
K 
- I tjk~<T!kl 
k•l 
(2b) 
where T)k • a~;ayJ and Tjk • a~;aaJ denote, respectively, the marginal impact 
of production and abatement effort in zone j on the ambient pollution level in 
zone k and 
denote the prior means producer's form regarding these marginal effects. In 
general, T(y. ,a.) is a nonlinear function of its arguments. However, if Tis 
linear, or approximately so near the optimal levels for y. and a., then the 
concentration taxes (i.e., the tJk's) influence production and abatement 
effort only through the tax indices: 
A • 
T •• ~ tj. TA· j kf:l • jk 
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This suggests that the optimal concentration tax matrix, developed in the next 
section, need not be unique in the multizone setting. 
2. Specification of the .optimal Tax 
The regulator's problem is then to set the optimal level of the tax 
rates (i.e., the tJt's) so as to maximize the expected sum of producer and 
consumer surplus, less the damages resulting from the ambient pollution levels 
generated by producers; i.e., X . . Specifically, the regulator solves: 
w• 
s. t. tij 2: 0 
• Max Y(t .. ) 
t .. 
s. t. tij 2: 0 
i,j-1, ... ,N 
i,j-l, ... ,N 
where Er() denotes the expectation operator given the regulator's prior 
distribution on< (i.e., fr(<)), t .. • (t1 .', ••• ,t •. ')' denotes theN X N 
(4) 
matrix of taxes, p(y) denotes the demand for the output produced and Y(t .. ) • 
• I yj(tj.) denotes system-wide production of y given taxes oft.. The 
j•l 




-I Er{ [ao;ax,][ cax,;ayj)(ayj;atjk) + cax,;aaj)(aaj;atjk) 1 l] 
n•l 
j,k-l, ... ,N 
j,k-l, ... ,N (Sb) 
and 
j,k-l, ... ,N (Sc) 
where 




• DJ • I Er [ cao;ax,)TJ'nl 
n•l 
(6b) 
denote the regulator's expectations regarding the system-wide damage resulting 
from a marginal change in output and ambient levels in zone j, respectively. 
Substituting the firm's first order conditions into (Sb) yields: 
R R 
0- tJk[ ti tJn T)n- D!Jayj;atJk + ti tJn Tjn- DjJaaj;atJkl (7) 
~1 ~l 
ll 
For tjk > 0, this is equivalent to 
• <I tJn T)nl (ayj;atJk) + 
n-1 
• <I tJn Tjnl (aaj;atJk) - D)(ayj;atJk) + Dj(aaj;atjk) 
n-1 
(7.) 
The left hand-side of equation (7') indicates the changes in marginal tax 
burden producers expect to be generated by a change in the tax rate tJk• while 
the right hand-side measures the marginal benefit of the tax rate in terms of 
reducing pollution damages. 
A number of special cases of the above problem are of interest. In 
particular, suppose that a1 is measured in terms of the effluent emissions 
level controlled. Then (-T~k) can be interpreted as a generalized transfer 
coefficient, depending upon both the level of production and abatement effort 
in zone j. If, in addition, it is assumed that the level of output does not 
directly influence the transport mechanism (i.e., T)k • 0), then equation (7') 
reduces to: 8 
j-1, ... ,N (8) 
Equation (8) provides a system of only N equations with N2 unknowns (i.e., the 
tjk's). With no direct relationship between the level of production and 
ambient pollution levels, the level of production (yj) becomes an implicit 
function of abatement effort (aj) through equation (2a). The tax now induces 
change in the concentration of pollution in each zone only through its impact 
on the level of abatement. The optimal level of abatement can be achieved 
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through an infinite number of combinations of tJk's, with no impact on the 
corresponding level of YJ· 
Case 1: The Single Polluter/Single Damage Site. In the case of a single 
polluter and a single damage site (i.e., N- 1), the optimal tax, t, becomes: 
A 
t - ii• 1 r• ( 8.) 
- E.[(8D/8X)(ax;aa)]/Ep[8X/8a] 
This is equivalent to Segerson's [10] equation (Sa) when the regulator and 
producers have the same prior on the transport mechanism. However, if the 
producers do not perceive that they have a significant influence on ambient 
concentration at the damage site (i·.e., Ep[ax;aa] is small relative to 
E.(8X/8a)), then twill have to be large in order to efficiently reduce the 
level of pollution damage. 9 
Case 2: Linear Damage Function, Multiple Zones. SupposeD() is linear in the 
XJ's, with 8D/8XJ • aJ. Then the optimal tax rates for the multiple zone 
model are defined by: 
ii• j 
j-1, ... ,N 
(9) 
where Tjk • Er(Tjkl denotes the regulator's expectation regarding the general-
ized transfer coefficient. ~ile the matrix of tJk's solving (9) need not be 
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unique, one solution can be found by noting that equation (9) identifies the 
diagonal elements in the matrix relationship: 
' t .. (T~.)' A(T~.)' 
where T~. • {T~nl, T~. • {Tjnl, and A • a.®iK, with iw being anN X 1 vector of 
ones and a. • (a1 , .•• ,aM). If T~. is invertible, then10 
If producers and regulators have the same prior means with regards to the 
transfer coefficients (i.e., T~. - T~ .) , then equation (10) reduces to t;k 
ak. That is, the marginal tax rate for all zones with respect to concentra-
tion impacts on zone k is simply the marginal damage cost from the increased 
concentration (ak). 
IV. INFORMATION 
In general, the burden of information required to implement the tax 
derived in Section III is significant. The regulator must know the nature of 
the firm's costs, the nature of demand, the ambient level of pollution in each 
zone, and the nature of the damages in area k from the ambient level of 
pollution. In addition, the regulator must be able to evaluate the expecta-
tions defined by the producer's prior distribution on the transport mechanism, 
as well as evaluate the expectations defined by its own prior distribution on 
the transport·mechanism. In this section, consideration is given to impact of 
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information costs and structure on the ambient tax mechanism developed above. 
A. Education Costs 
As illustrated in the case of a single polluter and single damage site 
(Case 1), the discrepancy between the prior beliefs of the regulator and the 
the producer can have a significant impact on the optimal tax policy. In the 
extreme, if producers in a given zone, say j, believe they are completely 
helpless to control concentration levels, the tax becomes a discrete policy 
tool. With !). • 0 and Tj. • 0, the first order conditions in equations (2a) 
and (2b) are independent of the ambient taxes. The policymaker must then 
choose between enduring the damage caused by the pollution emanating from zone 
j (i.e., by setting tJ. • 0) or driving the producers out of the market 
entirely by setting taxes at a level tJ. such that K(tJ.)·< 0. 
This problem is illustrated graphically in Figure l for the single zone 
case. For ease of exposition, abatement effort is assumed to be zero (i.e., a 
- 0), so that the firm influences concentration levels within the zone only 
through changes in the level of production. Total societal net benefits, W, 
can then be written as a function of output, y*, with 
y* 
W(y*) • Er<[ p(y)dy - C(y*,O) - D[T(y*,O, e)]) (10) 
with W(O) - 0. This relationship is illustrated in the upper quadrant of 
Figure 1. 
The lower quadrant of Figure 1 depicts y* as a function of the ambient 
tax level, t. If TY • 0, then the firm perceives its tax burden to be 
independent of its production level and y*(t) is determined by the solid line 
in the lower half of Figure 1. That is, y*(t) remains at a constant level 
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(i.e., y*(c)- y0 ) fort~ t 0 • ( t I py*(c)- C(y*(c),O)- tX). Once t 
exceeds t 0 , the tax burden becomes sufficient to drive the firm out of the 
market (i.e., y*(c)- 0, t > t 0). Under these circumstances, the ambient tax 
mechanism becomes a crude policy tool, only allowing the regulator to choose 
between (a) continued production and pollution (with w• - W(y0)) and (b) the 
termination of production (with w•- W(O)- 0). The former will be chosen as 
long as y0 < B in Figure l, while the latter will be preferred if Yo > B. 11 
A similar problem emerges when T)n and Tjn are small relative to their 
true values or those perceived by the regulating agency. Again, Figure l 
illustrates the situation for the single zone scenario. If TY is small, y*(c) 
will change little as the tax level is increased, as with the dashed line in 
Figure l. Eventually, however, the taxes will reach a level t 0 that will 
drive the firm from the market. In this case, the optimal policy will again 
A 
be to raise taxes beyond t 0, forcing the firm out of operation. If TY is 
larger, as in the case of the dotted line, then continued operation may be 
optimal, with output reduced from y0 to y0 using an ambient tax level of t 0. 
The range of policy alternatives, however, remains narrow and the optimal tax 
policy achieves a social welfare level, W0, substantially below the global 
maximum for w, w·. 
The above arguments suggest that the regulator's ability to ascertain 
and alter the firm's prior beliefs about the transport mechanism is likely to 
be crucial to the success in designing and implementing the ambient tax 
mechanism. If these education costs are high, emission standards or restric-
tions on technology, typically viewed as less efficient policy tools, may 
prove to be the more cost-effective policy mechanisms. 
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B. Monitoring Costs 
The analysis presented in Section III assumes that information on the 
true level of X. is known without cost to the regulator. In fact, • ... deter-
mining groundwater pollution and monitoring groundwater quality are extremely 
difficult and expensive.• (Ng [8], p. 777). The decision to impose an ambient 
tax must be considered jointly with the cost of obtaining the necessary 
measures of pollution concentration within each zone. Thus, equation (4) 
needs to be extended to include the cost of measuring ambient pollution in 
every area, k, on which a tax will be based. 
Let ok- l if the regulator chooses to measure the pollutant's concen-
tration in zone k, with ok - 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let Xk denote the cost 
of measuring ambient concentration in area k. The regulator's problem is then 
to solve: 
Y(t. .. ll.) N 
w·· -Max Er{ r p(y)dy- L Cj[yj(tj.t.),aj(tj.t.)]- D(X.)l- S.x. 
t. .. ,6. ~ j•l 
s. t. t,j 2: 0 i,j-l, ... ,N (ll) 
• Max W(t .. ,6.) 
t .. ,6. 
s.t. t 1J 2: 0 i,j-l, ... ,N 
where X· • (x1 , •.. ,x8 )', 6. • (6 1 , ... ,68 ), and t. • diag{ok). Equation (ll) can 
be written equivalently as a two stage maximization process, with 





w*c5.) .. Max W(t .. ,5.) 
t .. 
(13) 
Once monitoring costs are included, the regulator must decide which 
receptor sites should be monitored. This decision will be based, in part, on 
the regulator's priors on ambient concentration levels, X. These priors 
could be formed on the basis of two sorts of information. First, if the 
regulator has knowledge of y. and a., then priors on the transport mechanism 
induce a prior distribution on concentration levels. Second, whether y. and 
a. are known or not, the regulator may believe that ambient concentration 
levels are correlated in a way related to their spatial relationships. If so, 
then measurement at a given site will cause the regulator to revise priors on 
nearby concentrations. The possibility of spatial correlation casts the 
regulator's problem as one of optimal search. 12 The initial choice of sites 
to measure is based on priors about what will be found in the measurements, 
and subsequent measurement decisions are based on priors informed by the 
results of earlier measurement. 
The choice of 5. in (13) will also depend upon the priors held by 
producers. The measurement of a given site has two benefits to the regulator. 
First, it increases the flexibility of the tax policy by allowing c., > 0 once 
site k is measured. Second, it provides information with which priors on the 
transport mechanism can be updated. Depending upon the structure of producer 
priors, however, the former benefit may quickly become zero. For example, if 
Tis linear in y. and a., then, as indicated in Section III.B.l, the taxes 
influence firm behavior only through the tax indices T~ and T1. As long as 
18 
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TYk and T~k are non-zero for two k's, two sites will exhaust all flexibility 
benefits from monitoring additional sites. The corresponding t .• •s can be set 
so as to achieve the levels of T) and Tj that will induce the optimal y. and 
a. 
C. Knowledge of Pollutant Fate and Transport 
For a given source area, j, imposition of the tax for transfer to 
receptor area k will involve monitoring and education costs discussed above, 
as well as a reduction in the sum of producer and consumer surplus generated 
by production in area j. Since Tis not known with certainty, imposition of 
the tax may result in too much or too little pollution reduction at the 
receptor site, even when the producer's abatement response to the tax is 
perfectly anticipated by the regulator. Thus, the regul,ator's prior distribu-
tion on<, which determines the transport mechanism, induces a prior distribu-
tion on the net social value of extending the tax to account for transport 
from area j to area k. 
Let 
Y(t, .A) 
V(t .. ,5. ,<)- £ p(y)dy N I CJ[yj(tJ.t.),aj(tJ.t.)]- D(X.)- 5.x. 
j•l 
The W(t .. ,5.) of equation (11) is then given by 
W(t .. ,5.)- [V(t .. ,5.,<)fr(<)d<, 
. ( 14) 
where 0 denotes the state space of <. Equation (11) describes the "no data" 
problem of choosing an action, (t .. ,5.), to maximize the expected value of 
19 
V(). Regardless of this initial choice of (t .. ,5.) based on current beliefs 
regarding<, it may be desirable to acquire additional information about the 
transport mechanism to better inform subsequent regulatory decisions. 1> 
Suppose the regulator has the option to undertake a research project at a cost 
of ~ with outcome z E Z, related to < by the conditional distribution 
h(z 1 <). Using the outcome of the research project, the posterior expecta-
tion of V, conditional on z, is given by: 
'llp(t .. ,5. ,z) -I V(t .. ,5., <)fr(< I z)d< 
The regulator should fund the research project if 
~ < J ~~~ •. 'll(t .. , 5. ,z)g(z)dz -~a~ •. 'll(t .. , 5.) , 
where 
g(z) • I h(z I <)fr(<)d< 
This simple formulation of the regulator's problem of information acquisition 
in support of the Segerson tax neglects the multiperiod duration of the 
benefit of new information, and considers a single research project of fixed 
size and scope. In fact, acquisition of information on the physical processes 
influencing fate and transport of pollutants is best regarded as a long term 
investment, with benefits enduring over several periods. This suggests that 
the regulator's discount rate could be crucial to decisions regarding the 
desirability of research projects. Furthermore, the scope of research is 
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clearly endogenous. Not only is there flexibility in the total budget, ~. to 
be devoted to research on fate and transport, but there is a trade-off between 
the quality of information generated by the project and its geographic 
coverage. Thus, one project's information, characterized by h(z 1 <), could 
offer low variance of z given E for a restricted set of components of the 
vector of z. An alternative project with the same budget could offer an 
h(z 1 e) with higher variance for a less restricted set of components of z. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the role of information structure in the design 
of a particular mechanism for controlling non-point source pollution. The tax 
mechanism considered is based on ambient concentration of pollutants, and 
therefore must rely on the acquisition of information regarding concentrations 
at appropriately designated sites. The mechanism avoids routine acquisition 
of information concerning production and abatement practices of individual 
firms, but requires at least some information on fate and transport of the 
pollutant, as would any likely regulatory scheme. Information issues dis-
cussed in the context of this tax mechanism include the selection of sites for 
monitoring, the importance of ascertaining and perhaps influencing the beliefs 
of firms regarding the mechanism of pollutant transport, and the possibility 
of acquiring new information regarding the fate and transport of pollutants. 
The larger issue, and a clear next step in investigating the role of 
information in the design of regulatory mechanisms, is consideration of the 
choice among alternative regulatory mechanisms. Since regulatory mechanisms 
differ in their information requirements, and costs of acquiring and process-
ing information differ among the different contexts in which regulation may be 
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considered, it should be expected that the balancing of information costs 
against allocative merits of mechanisms will not lead to the superiority of 
any single structure of mechanism for all contexts. The economics of regula-
tion under imperfect information should provide a framework within which to 
consider the suitability of various mechanisms for regulatory contexts with 
differing information structures. Especially in the information intensive 
business of regulating non-point source pollutants, comparisons of alternative 
mechanism must be undertaken within this framework. 
VI. REFERENCES 
l. G. Anderson, J. Opaluch, and W. Sullivan, Nonpoint agricultural pollu-
tion: Pesticide contamination of groundwater supplies, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1238-1243 (1985). 
2. D. Besanko and D. E. M. Sappington, Designing Regulatory Policy with 
22 
Limited Information, Harwood Academic Publishers, New York (1987). 
3. N. Cressie, and P.B. Morgan, The VPRT, a sequential testing procedure 
dominating the SPRT, revision of preprint #86-17, Iowa State 
Statistical Laboratory (1989). 
4. A. J. Gold, S. Tso, P. V. August, and W. R. Wright, Using soil surveys 
to delineate stratified drift deposits for groundwater protection, 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, 232-234 (1989). 
5. C. D. Kolstad, Uniformity versus differentiation in regulating exter-
nalities, J.· Environ. Econom. Hanagement 14, 386-99 (1987). 
6. R. Mendelsohn, Regulating heterogeneous emissions, J. Environ. Econom. 
Hanagement 13, 301-12 (1986). 
7. P. Morgan, and R. Manning, Optimal search, Econometrica, 53, 923-944 
(1985). 
8. L. Ng,. A DRASTIC approach to controlling groundwater pollution, The Yale 
Law Journal, 98, 773-791 (1989). 
9. L. Olson, The search for environmental quality: The economics of 
screening and regulating environmental hazards, J. Environ. 
Econom. Hanagement, 19, l-18 (1990). 
10. K. Segerson, Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, 
J. Environ. Econom. Hanagement, 15, 87-98 (1988). 
ll. J. S. Shortle and J. W. Dunn, The relative efficiency of agricultural 
source water pollution control policies, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 668-677 (1986). 
12. W. 0. Spofford, A. J. Krupnick, and E. F. Wood, Sources of uncertainty 
in economic analysis of management strategies for controlling 
groundwater contamination, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 1234-1239 (1986). 
13. T. H. Tietenberg, Derived decision rules for pollution control in a 
general equilibrium space economy, J. Environ. Econom. Hanagement, 
l, 3-16 (1974). 
23 
14. R. A. Young, C. A. Onstad, D. D. Bosch, and W. P. Anderson, AGNPS: A 
nonpoint-source pollution model for evaluating agricultural 




1. There is also relevant literature, unrelated to environmental regulation, 
recently surveyed in Besanko and Sappington [2]. 
2. "In general, the more categories (markets) that units are divided into, the 
greater the administrative costs. • Mendelsohn [ 6]. The application in the final 
section of Mendelsohn's paper does not incorporate this consideration, but to do 
so would be a fairly straightforward extension. 
3. Typical of the literature's treatment of this admittedly difficult issue is 
the following. In the introduction to Kolstad [5, pp. 386-7], the author notes 
that: "The administrative costs of implementing firm-by-firm controls may be 
great. It is often difficult to obtain information regarding firm costs, the 
eventual fate of pollutants, and pollution damage .... That uniform regulations 
balance gains in administrative and informational efficiency with losses in 
allocational efficiency is obvious." In describing the formal model it is stated 
that: "Perfect information is assumed on the part of everyone." Kolstad [5, p. 
388] 0 
4. This notion of zones is similar to the one employed by Tietenberg [13]. 
5. Delineation of the zones within a given region is itself a difficult task. 
Recent work by Gold ec al. [4], Young et al. [14], and Anderson, Opaluch and 
Sullivan [1] provide potential tools for this process. 
6. In general, one 
:s 0, and 82Xtt/8aiaYi 
would 
:S 0 0 
expect 8Xtt/8Yi 2: o, axk;aai :s 0, 
That is, Xtt is convex in Yj and 
a2Xtt/ ayj 2: 
( -aj) . 
0, 82Xtt/8aj 
7. In general, the solution to the maximization process in (1) need not be an 
interior one. First, the necessary second order conditions may not hold when 
equations (2a) and (2b) are satisfied because T is not a convex function of Yi 
and ai· Second, with the imposition of the ambient tax, the farm may no longer 
be profitable, leading to exit from the market and a discontinuity in the 
objective function at points (yj,aj) such that profits are zero for a given ti .. 
This problem is discussed further in Section IV. 
8. Seger son [ 10] uses this restriction in deriving an optimal tax rate. 
However, the fate and transport of agricultural pollutants will generally depend 
upon the intensity of production, with Tik typically being positive. 
9. This assumes that the tax does not become so large as to drive the producer 
out of the market. This potential problem is discussed further in Section IV. 
10. If T~. is singular, this suggests that all of the farmers perceive a fixed 
relationship between the generalized transfer coefficients for two or more of the 
zones. For example, T~ k • 8T~ j . In this case the zones j and k can be combined 
for the purposes of imposing the ambient tax. 
25 
11. Given the usual curvature assumptions for D and T, y0 will lie to the right 
of A in Figure 1. 
12. Whether the search will be sequential (i.e., measuring ambient concentra-
tions one site at a time), fixed-sample-size (i.e., a one-time choice for 5.) or 
variable-sample-size (i.e., sequentially choosing the number of sites to measure) 
will depend upon the degree of perceived correlation between the Xj's and the 
discount factor with respect to time. The higher the perceived correlation, the 
greater will be the attraction for sequential search. See Morgan and Manning 
[7], Cressie and Morgan [3], and Olson (9]. 
13. In the case of agricultural non-point source pollution of groundwater, 
substantial resources are now being devoted to such an acquisition of informa-
tion. Olson (9] analyzes the similar problem of information acquisition on the 
carcinogenicity to inform regulatory decisions. 
Figure 1 
The Impact of Producer Priors end Yield 
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